

REMARKS

Reconsideration and allowance of the captioned application are respectfully requested.

Independent claim 26 is amended.

Claims 1, 3-14, 17-21, 26-29, 31-42, 45-49 and 58-60 were pending prior to the pending Office Action, and remain pending after the present amendment.

Independent claim 26 and its dependent claims 27 and 28 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101, as being “directed to a system while the claimed elements may be interpreted to recite only software.” While the applicants do not accept the justification of the rejection, they amend independent claim 26 for clarification and to expedite prosecution of the application. Claim 26 is amended to recite that at least one of the claimed elements of the claimed system is implemented at least partially in hardware. Accordingly, the §101 rejection should be overcome.

Claims 1, 3-14, 29 and 31-42 were rejected as being rendered obvious by Warsta (US 2004/0181550) in view of Malik (US 7,003,551).

Claims 17-21, 26-28 and 45-49 were rejected as being rendered obvious by Warsta in view of Malik and further in view of Kobata (US 2002/0077986).

Claims 58-60 were rejected as being rendered obvious by Warsta in view of Malik and further in view of Mattis (US 6,128,623).

The applicants respectfully traverse the rejections.

1. None of the references discloses “storing said content ID of said firstly transcoded version of multimedia content, as a stored first content ID, **in association with said stored multimedia content**,” as recited in independent claim 1 (emphasis added).

As claimed, the content ID of the firstly transcoded version of the multimedia content is stored in association with the stored multimedia content (i.e., with the content stored in accordance with the prior claim limitation of

“storing an item of multimedia content as stored multimedia content...”). That is, “said stored multimedia content” is *not* the same as “said firstly transcoded version of said multimedia content.”

The Office Action erroneously asserted that storing of the content ID of the transcoded version in association with the stored multimedia content can be found in Warsta at paragraph 58. However, Warsta paragraph 58 states that “adapted content is cached within database 616 and indexed according to content ID and terminal type”. There is nothing in paragraph 58 that suggests that the content ID of the adapted content is stored in association with the un-adapted content.

Unlike the Warsta disclosure, claim 1 does *not* recite any pre-adaptation of content, and does *not* recite storage of any adapted content at the MMSC. It does *not* recite that a transcoded version of the multimedia content is stored at the MMSC, but only that a content ID of the transcoded version is stored. Warsta, on the other hand, discloses that adapted content is cached at the MMSC (see, *inter alia*, paragraph 58).

2. Page 5 of the Office Action conceded that Warsta does not disclose

accessing said stored content **using said stored first content ID of said firstly transcoded version of said multimedia content**, said accessing comprising:

generating a received content ID of said copy of said firstly transcoded version of said multimedia content; and

looking up said stored multimedia content by **comparing said received content ID with said stored first content ID....**

as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added). The Office Action erroneously asserted that Malik teaches the lacking claim elements. However, the highlighted elements are not present or suggested by any of the cited references or by the combination of cited references.

As claimed, the stored content (i.e., the content stored in accordance with the prior claim limitation of “storing an item of multimedia content as stored multimedia content...”) is accessed by generating a received content ID and comparing that received content ID with the stored first content ID (i.e., the content ID *of the transcoded version* of the stored content, as recited earlier in the claim).

Malik’s attachment cache is only capable of finding, in the cache, an attachment which is *identical* to an attachment in a received e-mail message. Malik’s cache would be incapable of finding an attachment in the cache when the attachment in the e-mail message is a *transcoded version* of an attachment in the cache.

Malik does not suggest “accessing said stored content **using said stored first content ID of said firstly transcoded version of said multimedia content,**” as claimed.

3. Taken as a whole, Malik teaches that large attachments should be removed from e-mail messages and should be replaced by pointers to attachment files in an e-mail store. However, claim 1 recites “receiving... an instruction to forward said item of multimedia content to a second multimedia device, **said instruction comprising a copy of said firstly transcoded version of said**

multimedia content...” (emphasis added). Thus, Malik teaches away from the present invention as recited in claim 1.

4. None of the other cited references suggest the limitations discussed above, and claim 1 is not rendered obvious by the combination of cited references.

5. The other independent claims (26 and 29) include similar limitations as those discussed above. They were rejected based on the same reliance on Warsta and Malik, and are not rendered obvious by the combination of cited references for the same reasons as are discussed above with respect to independent claim 1.


6. All of the other claims depend directly or indirectly from one of the independent claims, and are not rendered obvious for at least that reason.

Reconsideration and allowance of the present application are respectfully requested.

Respectfully submitted,

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